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proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his
defence.' This represents a defence based on natural justice, and its primary purpose is to ensure
that a judgment will not be enforced in circumstances where defendants have not had the
opportunity to put their defence before the court which gave judgment (Case 166/80 Klomps,
[1981] ECR1593; Case C^172/91 Sonntag [1993] ECR1^1963; Case C^474/93 Hengst Import [1995]
ECR102113).
The firstpre-condition to the application of article 27(2) is to establish a d`efaultof appearance'. In the
present case,Maersk did notmake an appearance at any time in the limitation proceedings. Its later
appeal on the question of jurisdiction, in the opinion of the ECJ, could not be treated as an
appearance by Maersk in the limitation proceedings. Thereafter the question has to be asked
whether the document instituting the limitation proceedings had been served on Maersk and in
sufficient time to enable it to arrange for its defence. In answering this question, regard had to be
taken of the nature of limitation proceedings under Netherlands procedural law. Although the initial
and provision order of limitation was the product of a unilateral action by the applicant, it was
followed by a procedure which allowed the parties to make reasoned submissions to the court (as
described above).The order was notified toMaerskby the administrator appointedby the court, in a
validmanner underNetherlands procedural law andunder the Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters (1965), to which both the
Netherlands and Denmark were parties. The ECJ was of the opinion that the order and its
notification were to be treated as a document equivalent to a document instituting proceedings
within the meaning of article 27(2).Thereafter it was for the court in which enforcement is sought
to determinewhether notificationwas effected in the due and proper form and in sufficient time to
enable the defendant to arrange its defence effectively, taking into account all the circumstances of
the case (Case166/80 Klomps [1981] ECR1593; Case 29/84 Debaeket and Plouvier [1985] ECR1779).
In the result, the ECJ concluded that the limitation order could notbe refused recognition in another
contracting state because of the absence of prior service on Maersk, providing the order was
thereafter duly served on or notified to Maersk in good time.
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PERFORMANCE BONDS GIVEN BYA FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
Marubeni Hong Kong & South China Ltd vThe Mongolian Government
[2005] EWCACiv 395
Facts
Marubeni had entered into a contract for the sale of machinery with Buyan, a Mongolian company.
The contract provided for a guarantee to be issued by the Mongolian central bank on behalf of the
Mongolian Government.The Mongolian Ministry of Finance issued a letter described as a guarantee
onbehalf of theMongolianGovernment accompaniedby an opinion from the justiceminister that the
guarantor had full power and authority to enter into the guarantee.
Marubeni, having had to reschedule the debt twice, made a final demand for payment but Buyan still
failed to pay. Marubeni then issued proceedings to enforce the guarantee. The High Court gave
judgment for the Mongolian Government, holding that the refinancing of the contract involved a
material variation of the transaction to which the guarantee related and as such, the Mongolian
Government, as guarantor, was discharged from the guarantee.
Marubeni's argument was that the guarantee obligation was in the form of an unconditional
independent promise to pay on demand and did not operate as a simple guarantee which could be
defeated by a material variation of the underlying transaction.That was rejected by the High Court.
Marubeni appealed.
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Decision
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, characterizing the instrument not as a demand bond or
guarantee but as secondary or conditional promise to act as surety. Such a conditional promise was
subject to the rule inHolmev Brunskill (1878) 3QBD 495, meaning that the twice rescheduling of the
debt would have constituted a material variation of the suretyship upon which the surety would be
discharged. Although the terms of the guarantee had stated that it was payable on demand, in the
case of a non-banking instrument (such as this which was issued by the Mongolian Government and
not a bank for a commission) very clear and unambiguous language must be used to displace the
presumption against the finding of a primary undertaking.
Comment
It isworthremindingourselves thatwhere there is a primarypromise to pay, such as that in a demand
bond, that promise is unconditional and would be activated as long as the demand is made in
compliance with the stipulated documentary conditions. Such a promise or undertaking has been
characterized as potentially draconian and could lend itself to abusive calls. There is thus a
presumption that unless clear and explicit wording is used, the presumption would be i`n favour of a
constructionwhich holds a performance bond to be conditioned upon documents rather than facts'
(Esal Commodities v Oriental Credit [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 546, per Staughton LJ). On that basis, it is
particularly significant that the Court of Appeal made a distinction between performance bonds
issued by banks and those by non-banks.The court alluded to the fact that the banks make a profit
from issuing suchbonds through thereceiptof a commission. Althoughnotexpressly stated, itwould
also seem from the tenor of the court's judgment that a commercial background offers a sufficiently
strongbasis to construe in favourof the findingof a demandbond. In non-bankcases, therewas less of
a factualmatrix to guide the construction of the instrument in that direction.
The approach taken by the Court of Appeal in making that distinction does not offer businesses
interested in investing and selling abroad to countries with a high risk rating (resulting in few banks
being prepared to act as guarantors for local buyers) much comfort.This is especially so, given the
fact that a foreign government might quite legitimately be perceived by international investors as
being of a greater financial standing than a foreign bank. In such a context, the distinction made
between banks and government agencies who act as guarantors should not be material.The factual
andcommercialmatrix remains the same ^ in a standardperformancebond scenario, thebuyer's lack
of creditworthiness makes it difficult for the buyer to import, as such, a guarantee is required and
that guarantee is provided for by a third party who, in a casewhere no bank is prepared to step in, is
the government. It is difficult to seewhy the fact that the guarantor is the government shouldmake a
difference to the construction issue. A more apposite context would the international investment
environment; indeed, the court should have looked at the investment environment as forming the
factual matrix. Investors would be slow to assume the very high risk of investing in developing
countries without being able to rely on an expedient and no-questions-asked mechanism of
performance guarantee. That is especially so where, if default had to be first proved before the
guarantee can be relied on, the inconvenience, risk and expense of litigation in a foreign jurisdiction
and a foreign lawmight well be unavoidable.That said, however, there is still the precise wording of
the present instrumentwithwhich to contend.
The instrument read:
theundersignedMinistry of Finance ofMongolia unconditionally pledges to pay toyouuponyour simple
demand all amounts payable under the Agreement if notpaidwhen the samebecomes due (whether at
statedmaturity, by acceleration or otherwise) and further pledges the full and timely performance and
observance by the Buyer of all the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
The court considered it to mean that the obligation to pay could only arise when and if the amounts
payable under the agreement were not paid when they became due.The court thus concluded that
therewas no demandbond intended.On this issue, the court is on strongerground ^ it is particularly
perilous for the seller not to question, during negotiations, the reference in the letter to the
96 (2005) 11JIML : ANALYSIS ANDCOMMENT
Mongolian Government's pledging the full and timely performance of the buyer.That, coupled with
the presumption against a construction leaning to a demand bond, could naturally be taken to mean
that the performance bond is to provide a secondary undertaking following actual default.
JC
DEMISE (BAREBOAT) CHARTER ^ HIRE PURCHASE AGREEMENT ^
PAYMENT DEFAULT ^ WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE ^ INTERPRETATION ^
WAIVER ^ RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE
More OG Romsdal Fylkesbatar AS v the demise charterers of the ship Jotunheim
[2004] EWHC 671(Comm), [2005] 1Lloyd's Rep181
Facts
Owners chartered their vessel Jotunheim on the terms of an amended Barecon 89 Form to
charterers for a period of 48 months.The contract was in the nature of a hire/purchase agreement.
Part IVof the charter, which related to hire/purchase agreements, provided that at the termination
of the period, title would pass to the charterers, provided the charterers had fulfilled their
obligations under the charter.The payment provisions provided that hire was to be paid monthly at
the rate of US$15,104.17, payments to bemade in advance and discountless.On signing the charter a
deposit of US$25,000 was payable, and thereafter lump sum deposits of either US$50,000 or
US$75,000 were payable concurrently with the six, twelve and sixteenmonths hire payments.
Clause 32 provided: ^
It is hereby agreed between sellers and buyers that in case of buyers' default for non-payment of hire
monies due to owners or non-performance of any of the agreed terms within the realm of this
agreement the vessel will return back to the sellers free from all expenses incurred, if any, such as
crew wages, port expenses, fuel invoices andwith the remaining fuel on board free of cost to the seller.
Should thebuyers default seller will notbe obliged to payback anymoneyputdownduring thebareboat
period. If the hire paid down during the bareboat period does not cover the sellers' losses they shall be
entitled to claim further compensation for their losses and for all expenses.
Following the delivery of the vessel, the hirewas paid some five days late.The second instalmentwas
also paid a similar period of time late.Deductions also appear to have been made in respect of bank
charges. The owners urged the charterers to make good the shortfalls and threatened the
withdrawal of the vessel unless the third monthly payment was paid on time. It was not, and two
days after the due date the owners' brokers advised the charterers' brokers that the owners were
proposing towithdraw thevessel. Shortly thereafter the owners' brokers sent an email giving notice
of thewithdrawal of the vessel.
The owners arrested the vessel and claimed possession of it on the basis that the charter had been
validly terminated, for they were entitled to withdraw the vessel under clause 32. The charterers
pleaded to the contrary, arguing:
(i) that the agreement was a conditional sale contract and not a hire/purchase agreement, and
therefore stipulations as to payment were not of the essence of the agreement
(ii) the ownershadwaived their right towithdraw for non-paymentof hireby failing to do sowithin
a reasonable period of time
(iii) the court had jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture and should exercise that jurisdiction.
Decision
The court on an application for summary judgment by each party held:
(i) the Charter in clause 32 set out the consequences of failure to pay hirewhen due and therefore
it was unnecessary for the charter to specify that the time of payment was of the essence of
the agreement
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